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Government size and output volatility: 
is there a relationship? 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 8/2005 
Matti Virén 




This paper provides some further tests for the proposition that a larger public 
sector leads to smaller output volatility. Both Gali and Fatas & Mihov have 
provided some evidence which appears to support this proposition. Their evidence 
is, however, based on a relatively small sample of countries. In this study, we go 
beyond the OECD sample and focus on a much larger World Bank data set 
covering up to 208 countries for the period 1960–2002. We also seek to utilise 
some time series aspects of the material by using pooled cross-section time series 
data. Tests with different models and measures clearly indicate that the original 
results are not very robust and the relationship between government size and 
output volatility is either nonexistent or very weak at best. 
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Julkisen sektorin koko ja tuotannon volatiilisuus: 
onko niiden välillä riippuvuutta? 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
Keskustelualoitteita 8/2005 
Matti Virén 




Tutkimuksessa on testattu oletusta, jonka mukaan suurempi julkinen sektori johtaa 
pienempään kokonaistuotannon vaihteluun. Gali sekä Fatas ja Mihov ovat empii-
risissä töissään päätyneet tulokseen, joka tukee tätä oletusta. Empiirinen tuki on 
kuitenkin perustunut verraten pieneen otokseen maailman maista. Tässä tutkimuk-
sessa laajennetaan otosta OECD-maiden ulkopuolelle ja tukeudutaan paljon laa-
jempaan Maailmanpankin tilastoaineistoon, joka käsittää suurimmillaan 208 
maata ja kattaa ajanjakson 1960–2002. Tutkimuksessa pyritään myös käyttämään 
hyväksi tilastoaineiston aikasarjaominaisuuksia niin sanotun puulatun aikasarja-
poikkileikkausaineiston mielessä. Testit eri malleilla ja mittaustavoilla osoittavat 
selvästi, että alkuperäinen tulos ei ole kovin robusti ja riippuvuus julkisen sektorin 
koon ja tuotannon vaihteluiden välillä on joko olematon tai parhaimmillaan hyvin 
heikko. 
 
Avainsanat: julkisen sektorin koko, finanssipolitiikka, automaattiset vakauttajat 
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Recently, the role of automatic stabilisers and the effectiveness of fiscal policy in 
general have become important issues in Europe, at least. The explanation is 
obvious: Euro and The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The importance of the 
issue has increased along with the recent structural and cyclical public sector 
financing problems which no more can be rescued by monetary policy measures. 
  The evaluation of the effectiveness of fiscal policy is a quite complicated 
matter because it requires that we are able to control the key economic variables 
and shocks. Basically, it would require a large macro-model which would among 
other things include all key fiscal policy parameters and behavioural equations 
and which would facilitate an evaluation of so-called automatic stabilisers. 
Although in the past several attempts have been made to assess the effectiveness 
of policy by using macro-model based approach it is now generally considered 
that some simpler devices have be found for that purpose.
1 The particular piece of 
analysis which has been used extensively in this literature is the paper by Gali 
(1994). More recent analyses include Fatas and Mihov (2001a,b) and Andres, 
Domenech and Fatas (2004). All of those use cross-section data from OECD 
countries and estimate a simple equation in which the standard deviation of output 
growth (or, the Hodrick–Prescott residual of GDP) is explained by the 
government expenditure/GDP ratio and by several control variables such as the 
openness of the economy. 
  Silgoner, Reitschuler and Crespo-Cuaresma (2003) go a bit further by not 
only using cross-section data but instead five-year period panel data for the OECD 
countries.
2 
  Basically, this paper is an extension of the above mentioned empirical 
analyses in the following respects: 
 
–  We use more extensive international data set for more than 150 countries 
–  We use an extensive list of controls 
–  We use several empirical measures for both output volatility and government 
size 
–  We use both cross-section and panel data 
–  We use both a long (1960–2001) and a short (1987–2001) sample period 
 
                                                 
1 See eg Christiano (1984) and Van den Noord (2000) for more detailed analysis on the automatic 
stabilisers. For macromodel based approach in evaluating the impact of automatic stabilisers, see 
eg Barrell, Hurst, Pina (2002) and Dudek, Pachucki and Virén (2004). 
2 Also Koskela and Virén (2003) use a panel data set-up to examine the government size – output 
volatility relationship. They find only little evidence on a (negative) relationship between output 
volatility and government size.  
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The data on described in more detail in the data appendix. 
  Bore going to the data and to empirical analysis it might be worthwhile to 
consider shortly the reasons why bigger government might lower output volatility. 
Take a very simple aggregate demand model which just includes the income tax 
rate. So, assume that private consumption is determined by a simple Keynesian 
classroom model: 
 
Y ) t 1 ( c C − =  
 
while Y = C + G + X. 
  One can then get the following derivative w.r.t the tax rate: 
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Thus, the tax rate tends to diminish output volatility while public consumption 
expenditure volatility (similarly to exogenous demand component’s volatility) 
obviously translates to larger output volatility. 
  Thus, the tax effect reflects the automatic stabiliser’s effect while Var(G) 
reflects the fact that government itself may increase output volatility via various 
expenditure (and revenue) shocks. The relationship between tax rates and the 
government size is complex but, in general, we can argue that bigger government 
implies higher tax (income) rates. This fact is also supported by our data: thus the 
coefficient of correlation between gross tax rate (government revenues/GDP) and 
the highest marginal personal income tax rate is 0.41 and while with the highest 
marginal corporate tax rate it is 0.23
3. In other words, it is not possible to run big 
government with flat income tax rates. Later on (Table 6), we present some 
                                                 
3 If the total expenditures/GDP ratio is the indicator of government size, correlations are much 
lower. Thus eg cor(EXP,TAXC) = 0.17. Obviously the highest marginal income tax rate – which 
would be the proper indicator – is different from the average marginal income tax rate.  
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evidence that the marginal tax rate do indeed affect output volatility beyond the 
public sector size variable.
4 
  It is important to notice that output volatility depends directly on government 
expenditure volatility. This clearly shows up in Table 1. The most volatile 
components of total output are investment, exports and imports. Public 
consumption appears to be a bit more volatile than private consumption. On the 
basis of these numbers one might argue that government size is not the key 
determinant of output volatility but instead the determinants of investment and 
foreign trade are of crucial importance.
5 
  One thing that we can do here to distinguish different effects is to look at 
instead of total output (GDP) volatility also private output or private consumption 
(growth) volatility. That might give us a better estimate of the balancing role of 
automatic stabilisers (taxes, in particular). In fact, this is done in the subsequent 
empirical analysis to which we turn now. 
 
 
2 Empirical  analysis 
The empirical analysis consists of scrutinizing (a) the pair wise relationship 
between various measures of output volatility and government size, (b) estimating 
the output volatility model with various control variables and (c) estimating the 
output volatility model with pooled cross-country data. 
  The pair wise correlations are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 and the results 
with simple two-variable model in Tables 2 and 3. The bottom line in these 
                                                 
4 The fact that ‘taxes’ reduce total output volatility shows up even if we did not introduce any 
consumption function but instead introduced more general macromodel set up. Thus, if one take 
the McCallum and Whitaker (1979) model as a point of reference, the following rational 
expectations solution can be derived for (total) output: 
y = a0 + a2y–1 + (b1u + a2c2v + a1b1e)/(b1+ a1b1c1 + a1c2(1–b3τ)) 
where u, v and e are aggregate supply, IS and LM equation shocks, a1 denote the price ‘surprise’ 
term coefficient in aggregate supply equation, b1 the real interest rate coefficient in the IS 
equation, c1 the income variable coefficient in the LM equation, c2 the interest rate coefficient in 
the LM equation and b3 the tax liabilities coefficient in the IS curve equation. Taxes are modelled 
as  τ0 + τy. It is straightforward to show that Var(y) decreases when the tax rate τ increases 
(basically up the level of τ = 1). Notice that even if the mode includes a fiscal policy feedback rule 
in terms of public expenditure the parameters of this rule do not show in the solution of output. 
This is true as long as government spending does not depend on current output (or prices or the 
interest rate). 
5 These determinants might, of course, include tax rates and other public sector policy parameters. 
But those might not be related very strongly to the size of the public sector. Take for instance taxes 
on international trade. The median value of those taxes out of total government revenues is 
currently about 6 per cent).  
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analyses is the difference between OECD countries and the rest of the world. With 
the OECD data a negative relationship between volatility and public sector size 
might be detected although it is far from precise. With the larger data set, 
however, the relationship appears to be very weak, if nonexistent. As mentioned 
above, earlier studies have just made use of data from OECD countries. In this 
respect, our results are well in accordance with these earlier studies. 
  Even if the data for the OECD countries is presumably better than for most 
non-OECD countries, we have the problem that the OECD countries are relatively 
homogenous with relatively little variance for the size of the government. 
Moreover, the very small number of observations represents an obvious caveat as 
can already be seen from Figure 2, and this is not only due to the small sample 
bias. Thus a couple of influential observations can easily affect the main outcome. 
  When scrutinizing the results in Table 2, one may observe that the various 
proxies for government size behave somewhat differently. Thus, the gross tax rate 
(TAX) is more consistent with the negative relationship proposition. By contrast, 
the expenditure variable (EXP) behaves quite badly from the point of this 
proposition. Thus, the coefficient is practically always equal to zero. With public 
consumption (GGC), evidence is somewhat mixed: the coefficient is some cases 
negative (with reasonable t-ratios) but in some other cases the coefficient is 
clearly (and significantly) positive! 
 The  result  appears  to be quite robust.
6 Thus, estimates for different sub-
samples (in terms of output variability) do not make much difference (see 
Table 3). 
  One way of avoiding a possible spurious relationship is to have some controls 
in the output volatility model. Obviously, there is endless list of these variables 
but we concentrate here on variables which have been used previous studies and 
which take into account the structure of economy (share of agriculture of total 
output), openness of the economy (foreign trade/GDP)
7, size of the country 
(population and population density), monetary policy (failures) (the inflation rate) 
and the level of overall development (GDP per capita in USD). The list of 
controls also includes the military expenditures/GDP ratio which in fact appears 
to be quite important explanatory variable in the model suggesting that political 
crises have an important effect on output volatility. Thus, military expenditures 
                                                 
6 The cross-section equations were also estimated with a robust (Huber) estimator. That did not 
make qualitative change in results. The values of the coefficients did change somewhat but even 
then the ‘t-ratios’ remained very low thinking about the null hypothesis of zero coefficient for the 
government size variable. Take just one example: the regression between Var(g) and tax. The  
‘t-ratio’ changed from 1.06 to 0.68 for the log period (from 1.01 to 1.72 for the short period). 
7 The openness argument comes from Rodick (1998) who argues that there is a (positive) 
correlation between an economy’s trade and the size of government because open countries are 
more subject to external shocks and to offset these shocks they choose a lager public sector. For 
more on issue see eg Alesina and Wacziak (1998).  
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may not stabilize the economy even if they would lead to bigger government. 
Finally, we have also the average growth rate of the economy to account he for 
possibility that higher average growth rate simply leads to higher volatility (in the 
same way as higher inflation shows up in higher inflation variability).  
  As pointed out above, the final analyses deal with the pooled cross country 
data which are reported in Table 5. When doing these analyses we face the 
problem of finding a measure for the ‘annual’ volatility of output. Because there is 
no perfect measure we chose to use the following alternative proxies: 
 
–  The squared value of the GDP growth rate (G
2) 
–  The squared value of Hodrick-Prescott (HP) residual (Yhp
2) 
–  The squared residual of an AR(1) model for the GDP growth rates (Res
2) 
 
The HP trend is computed both for the GDP and private production (GDP-CQ). 
The latter variable in denoted by Yhpp
2. Accordingly, the growth rate is computed 
both for the unadjusted GDP growth rate, GDP per capita growth rate and the 
growth rate of private consumption. These variables are denoted by G, Gpc and 
Gcons, respectively. Thus all in all, we have a relative extensive set of measures 
for output variability which are supposed to cover all obvious measurement errors 
with the concept of government size. 
  Here we just report the coefficient estimates of the government size variable. 
That is because of space reasons and because the other coefficients behave more 
or less in the same way for all specifications. Anyway, to give some idea of the 
flavour of the complete results we present here just one equation (equation 1 in 
Table 5). 
 
2321 n , 77 . 1 DW , 35 . 72 SEE , 203 . 2 R
DENSITY * 006 . POP * 920 .
TRADE * 448 . GDPpc * 072 . AGRI * 526 . INF * 282 . TAX * 206 . c G
) 26 . 0 ( ) 70 . 4 (
) 83 . 2 ( ) 10 . 1 ( ) 96 . 0 ( ) 17 . 1 ( ) 38 . 0 ( i i
2
= = = =
+ −
+ + + + − =∑
 
 
The results follow the same pattern as in Tables 2–4. Thus, the coefficient of the 
TAX variable is negative marginally significant in several cases but in most cases 
the t-ratios are well below one. The other proxies give even less support to 
proposition that there is a negative relationship between output volatility and 
government size. Take for instance total expenditure/GDP ratio. Its coefficient is 
always either positive or insignificant (with conventional significance levels of the 
t-statistic). 
  Different estimators make some difference but the main difference comes 
from different proxies and sample periods. Thus, for instance, instrumenting the 
government size variables to take into account the possible (simultaneous) effects  
12 
from economics shocks to government behaviour does not seem to make any 
noticeable difference in results (and this really applies to a large set possible 
instruments). Similarly, different treatment of time and country effects does not 
produce any qualitative difference in results. As one might expect, the 
government size variables can be estimated (seemingly) more precisely when we 
nullify both the period and individual country effects. However, this shows up in 
the overall performance of the model in a negative way. 
  Thus, one may conclude that there is no robust relationship between 
government size and output volatility. It is also obvious that government size 
itself is not good stabilizing factor. Instead the marginal tax rates (and possible 
cyclically related expenditure effects) are more important. Some, although very 





The question of whether automatic stabilisers work or not is no doubt very 
important. It is only that one cannot easily measure the contribution of these 
stabilisers. The idea to use the government size-output volatility relationship as 
evidence of the contribution of automatic stabilisers is obviously tempting but this 
paper suggests that things are not easy. First of all, there is no clear one-to-one 
link between the size of government and the effectiveness of automatic stabilisers. 
Secondly, it looks that there is no strong relationship between these variables and 
the previous findings may just reflect some peculiar features of the small samples 
which have thus far been used empirical analyses. Maybe, it would be more useful 
to try to get more accurate measures of the key determinants of automatic 
stabilisers (say, of the average marginal income tax rate) and relate those to 
indicators of cyclical activity. Just expanding the government may not increase 
stability but it can produce a contrary result, especially if the volatility of 
government expenditures cannot be properly controlled. 
 
                                                 
8 Just recently, we were able to update the data so that it now cover 208 countries and the most 
recent observations are for 2002. The results with thesee new data qualitatively similar to the ‘old’ 
data although they may a bit better  match with stabilization story. (see Appendix 2). In particular 
this is true with the robust estimates. This feature is also supported by the simple fiscal reaction 
equations in which the (components of) government deficits are explained by the growth rate of 
GDP (and some control variables). In these equations, deficits seem systematically to decrease 
along with higher GDP growth (ie in a counter-cyclical manner).  
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Table 1.   Descriptive cross-country data on aggregate 
      demand and supply components 
 
  ∆GDP  ∆GC  ∆I  ∆CQ  ∆EXPO  ∆IMP 
Mean  0.034 0.033 0.035 0.033 0.050 0.043 
Median  0.037 0.033 0.041 0.034 0.054 0.050 
Std.  Dev.  0.053 0.110 0.171 0.080 0.157 0.146 
∆ indicates here log differences. Number of cross sections is 155 while the number of 




Table 2.   Cross-section estimation results with a simple 
     model 
 
dep var  regressor  Period  sample  coefficient  t-ratio/ 
PCT-ratio 
R2 
Var(g) tax  1960–2001  OECD    -.241  2.26/2.47  .303
Var(g) exp  1960–2001  OECD    -.141  1.43/1.61  .093
Var(g) ggc  1960–2001  OECD    -.668  3.14/3.37  .331
Var(g) tax  1987–2001  OECD    -.086  1.03/1.77  .050
Var(g) exp  1987–2001  OECD    -.047  0.63/0.64  .020
Var(g) ggc  1987–2001  OECD    -.012  0.07/0.07  .000
Var(g)  tax  1960–2001  World  -.525  1.06/1.76  .007
Var(g)  exp  1960–2001  World  -.162  0.43/0.72  .001
Var(g) ggc  1960–2001  World    1.627  2.43/2.12  .032
Var(g) tax  1987–2001  World    -1.046  1.01/1.49  .007
Var(g)  exp  1987–2001  World  -.233  0.25/1-30  .000
Var(g) ggc  1987–2001  World    .349  0.61/0.02  .002
Var(yhp) tax  1960–2001  OECD    -.022  2.00/2.76  .173
Var(yhp) exp  1960–2001  OECD    -.015  1.47/1.92  .103
Var(yhp) ggc  1960–2001  OECD    -.058  2.46/4.29  .241
Var(yhp) tax  1987–2001  OECD    -.009  .058/1.02  .018
Var(yhp) exp  1987–2001  OECD    -.004  0.30/0.53  .005
Var(yhp) ggc  1987–2001  OECD    .014  0.42/0.51  .008
Var(yhp)  tax  1960–2001  World  -.061  1.39/1.56  .004
Var(yhp)  exp  1960–2001  World  -.036  1.08/1.19  .008
Var(yhp) ggc  1960–2001  World    .088  0.800.88  .004
Var(yhp) tax  1987–2001  World    -1.280  1.47/1.49  .016
Var(yhp) exp  1987–2001  World    -1.171  1.54/1.30  .017
Var(yhp)  ggc  1987–2001  World  -.020  0.17/0.02  .000
Var(yhpp)  tax  1960–2001  World  -.648  1.32/1.83  .012
Var(yhpp) exp  1960–2001  World    .142  0.39/0.46  .001
Var(yhpp) ggc  1960–2001  World    4.964  1.64/1.55  .017
Var(yres)  tax  1960–2001  World  -.514  0.78/1.77  .004
Var(yres)  exp  1960–2001  World  -.085  0.17/0.45  .000
Var(yres) ggc  1960–2001  World    .199  0.42/0.51  .001
Var(yres) tax  1987–2001  World    -1.067  1.313.09  .012
Var(yres)  exp  1987–2001  World  -.329  0.450.95  .001
Var(yres) ggc  1987–2001  World    .163  0.330.33  .001
Var(gcons)  tax  1960–2001  World  -.558  0.44/0.42  .001
Var(gcons) exp 1960–2001  World    .721  0.77/0.58  .004
Var(gcons) ggc 1960–2001  World    10.173  3.96/2.16  .089
All estimates are OLS estimates. The OECD data include 22 observations and the 
‘World’ data 158 observations. The first t-ratio is unadjusted while the second (PCT) is 




Table 3.   OLS estimates of the simple model for different 
     volatility  regimes 
 
Var(g) Coefficient t-ratio 
< 5    -.035    1.73 
5–10   -.049   1.48 
10–20  .026    0.46 
20–30  .024    0.18 
30–40   -.041    0.27 
40–50  .108    0.68 
> 50    -1.176    0.18 
      The regressor is the TAX variable. 
 
 
Table 4.   Estimates of an extended cross-section model 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
TAX  -.407     -.074 -.411 -.284  -.641 
  (1.52)     (1.87) (1.43) (1.22)  (1.44) 
EXP    -.068       
    (0.49)       
GGC     -1.121      
     ( 1 . 5 5 )       
MIL  7.115 7.436 6.032 4.529 6.570 4.860  3.078 
  (2.47) (2.62) (3.36) (0.70) (2.38) (2.51)  (1.86) 
INF  .091 .093 .088 .147   .030   
  (2.24) (2.26) (2.30) (3.66)   (1.88)   
POP 4.950  5.143  -5.906  -.012  -5.336  -4.662  -7.020 
  (1.71) (1.77) (1.97) (0.00) (3.11) (2.50)  (3.60) 
TRADE  .057 .042 .071 .039    -.011   
  (0.60) (0.46) (0.75) (2.88)   (0.18)   
GDPpc  -.008 -.016 -.011 -.005    .000   
  (0.07) (0.14) (0.01) (0.49)   (0.32)   
AGRI .488 .552 .442 .544 .450 .591  .744 
  (1.07) (1.23) (1.02) (1.09) (2.12) (2.01)  (2.13) 
G  -1.734 -1.480 -2.511 -1.126    -.090   
 (0.68)    (0.57)  (0.98) (4.96)   (0.05)   
R2  .311 .302 .302 .466 .216 .315  .145 
SEE  38.97 39.19 40.45 47.38 40.67 25.81  47.50 



















Table 5.   Estimates of the government size variable 




sample estimator  definition 
of govsize 
coefficient t-ratio  DW 
G
2 1960–2001  OLS-FE  TAX  -.206  0.38  1.77 
G
2 1960–2001  OLS-FE  EXP  .206  0.60  1.77 
G
2 1960–2001  OLS-FE  GGC  -.481  0.61  1.62 
Gpc2 1960–2001  OLS-FE  TAX  -.296  0.64  1.77 
G
2 1960–2001  Random-e  TAX  -.550  1.25  1.64 
G
2 1960–2001  Random-e  EXP  .128  0.49  1.65 
G
2 1960–2001  Random-e  GGC  -.239  0.46  1.54 
G
2 1960–2001  IV-FE  TAX  -.074  0.93  1.72 
G
2 1987–2001  IV-FE  TAX  -1.133  0.64  2.46 
Yhp
2 1960–2001  OLS-FE  TAX  -.403  0.72  1.11 
Yhp
2 1960–2001  OLS-FE  EXP  .064  0.19  1.13 
Yhp
2 1960–2001  OLS-FE  GGC  -.203  0.29  1.46 
Yhpp
2 1960–2001  OLS-FE  TAX  -1.774  1.46  1.38 
Yhpp
2 1960–2001  Random-e  TAX  -1.592  1.86  1.20 
Yhpp
2 1960–2001  OLS-FE  EXP  .837  0.84  1.22 
Yhpp
2 1960–2001  OLS-FE  GGC  4.777  2.00  1.31 
G
2 1987–2001  OLS-FE  TAX  -1.076  0.87  2.39 
G
2 1987–2001  OLS-FE  EXP  -.616  0.61  2.39 
G
2 1987–2001  OLS-FE  GGC  1.112  0.78  1.88 
res
2 1960–2001  OLS-FE  TAX  -.508  1.21  1.95 
res
2 1960–2001  OLS-FE  EXP .001  0.00  1.91 
res
2 1960–2001  OLS-FE  GGC .372  0.70  1.68 
G
2 1960–2001  OLS  TAX  -.867  2.33  1.53 
G
2 1987–2001  OLS  TAX  -1.479  2.57  1.98 
G
2 1987–2001  IV  TAX  -1.481  2.32  2.03 
G
2 1960–2001  OLS  EXP  -.054  0.26  1.50 
G
2 1960–2001  OLS  GGC  -.327  0.96  1.42 
Yhp
2 1960–2001  OLS  TAX  -.470  1.59  0.91 
Yhp
2 1960–2001  OLS EXP  -.348  1.39  0.92 
Yhp
2 1960–2001  OLS  GGC  -1.216  2.51  1.29 
res
2 1960–2001  OLS  TAX  -.511  2.62  1.69 
res
2 1960–2001  OLS  EXP -.013  0.12  1.61 
res
2 1960–2001  OLS  GGC .228  0.86  1.51 
G
2 1960–2001  OLS-FE*  TAX  -.150  0.30  1.77 
G
2 1960–2001  OLS-FE*  EXP  .285  0.80  1.77 
G
2 1960–2001  OLS-FE*  GGC  -.485  0.64  1.60 
G
2 1960–2001  SUR-FE  TAX  -.011  0.05  2.03 
G
2 1960–2001  SUR-FE  EXP  -.030  0.20  2.06 
G
2 1960–2001  SUR-FE  GGC  -.824  2.28  2.02 
Gcons
2 1960–2001  OLS-FE TAX  1.179  1.30  2.05 
Gcons
2 1960–2001  Random-e  TAX  .085  0.19  1.92 
Gcons
2 1960–2001  OLS  TAX  -.277  0.81  1.74 
Gcons
2 1960–2001  OLS-FE EXP  .231  0.48  2.02 
Gcons
2 1960–2001  OLS-FE GGC  -1.624  0.61  1.86 
Cross-section heteroskedasticity corrected t-values are in the sixth column. All equation (except for the last 
three) include the following additional regressors: constant, INF, AGRI, GDPpc, TRADE, POP and 
DENSITY. The list of instruments  for govsize includes (in addition to the exogenous variables) lagged 
values of TAX, EXP, DEF and DEBT plus RR (the latter three from the short sample only). FE refers to fixed 
effects, FE* to fixed cross-section and time-series effects, random-e to random cross-section effects and, 
finally SUR-FE the period SUR & fixed cross section effects estimation. 
  
17 
Table 6.   Cross-section estimates of different tax rate 
     coefficients 
 
constant EXP  GGC  TAXC TAXP  R2  SEE 
43.487 .133    -.747 -.085 .155 30.53 
(2.65)  (0.38)  (1.35)  (0.38)    
34.69   .715  -.680  -.142  .072  26.74 
(2.58)   (1.42)  (1.50)  (0.75)    




Figure 1.  Output volatility and government size in the World 

























































Figure 2.  Output volatility and government size 
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Data definition and sources 
AGRI  Agriculture output (% of GDP) 
CQ  Private consumption expenditure at constant prices 
DEBT  General government debt (% of GDP) 
DEF  General government net balance (% of GDP) 
DENSITY  Population density (people per sq km) 
EXP  General government expenditure (% of GDP) 
EXPO  Exports of goods and services at constant prices 
G  growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), % 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GDPpc  Gross Domestic Product per capita in USD 
GGC  Government consumption expenditure (% of GDP) 
Gpc  Growth rate of per capita GDP 
GQ  Government consumption expenditure at constant prices 
IMP  Imports of goods and services at constant prices 
INF  Inflation (% rate) 
IP  Investment expenditure constant prices 
MIL  Military expenditure (% of GDP) 
POP  Log of total population 
RES  residual from an AR(1) model for G with gross-section specific AR 
parameters and fixed time effects 
TAX   General government revenues (% of GDP) 
TAXC Highest  marginal  rate in corporate taxation 
TAXP   Highest marginal tax rate in personal taxation 
TRADE  Foreign trade (% of GDP) 
Var(g)  Sample variance of G 
Var(gcons)  Sample variance of private consumption growth rate 
YHP  Hodrick-Prescott residual of log(GDP) with weight parameter 100 
YHPP  Hodrick-Prescott residual of log(GDP-GQ) with weight parameter 
100 
 
Most of the data come from the World Development Indicators 2003 CD (World 
Bank). The data cover the period 1960–2001. For several series the data are 
deficient so that the models which include the control variables can be estimated 
from 1975–2001 only. The total number of countries is 192 but in data 
deficiencies reduce the final sample to 158 countries. The OECD sample consists 
of 22 countries. The data are annual. Basically two alternative samples are used: 
the long one for 1960–2001, and the more recent one for 1987–2001. 
  Results in Appendix 2 represent an updated version of the data from World 
Development Indicators 2004 CD and cover 208 countries for the period 1960–
2002. These data are organized in the same way as the old data.  
22 
Appendix 2 
Results with the updated data for 1960–2002 
Table A1.  OLS estimates for the updated panel data 
 
Estimator 
Dependent variable  EXP GGC TAX  R
2 SEE  n 
OLS -.040      0.001  1.39  3232 
VAR(y)  (0.40)    0.007   
OLS -.007      0.002  1.28  3232 
ABS(y)  (2.00)    0.039   
OLS    .00   .000 1.35  5402 
VAR(y)    (0.36)   0.016   
OLS   -.027    0.002  1.18  5402 
ABS(y)    (2.06)   0.047   
OLS     -.059  0.008  1.40  3226 
VAR(y)     (4.32)  0.007   
OLS     -.414  0.016  1.29  3226 
ABS(y)     (5.27)  0.038   
OLS     -.075  0.058  1.35  2961 
VAR(y)     (4.26)  0.037   
Numbers inside parentheses are autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity adjusted t-ratios. 
The dependent variable is either the squared growth rate of GDP Var(y) or the 
corresponding absolute value ABS(y). With last equation (last row), the equation also 
includes the AGRI, POP and TRADE variables. n denotes total number of observations. 
 
 
Table A2.  Robust coefficient estimates 
      for the updated panel data 
 
Dependent variable  EXP  GGC  TAX 
VAR(y) -.016     
 (6.05)     
ABS(y) -.228     
 (6.25)     
VAR(y)   -.055   
   (10.73)   
ABS(y)   -.684   
   (9.95)   
VAR(y)     -.025 
     (6.65) 
ABS(y)     -.401 
     (7.99) 
Numbers inside parentheses are (approximate) t-ratios. All estimates are Huber M -
estimates. All equations include in addition to the government size variable also the 
AGRI, POP and TRADE. The dependent variables is VAR(y) 
  
23 
Table A3.  Panel data estimates for the updated panel data 
 
Estimation 
method  EXP GGC TAX  R
2/SEE DW 
FE  -.001    0.200  1.76 
  (0.07)    0.007  
RE  -.004    0.020  1.66 
  (0.26)    0.007  
FE   -.274    0.127  1.58 
    (1.74)   0.015  
RE   -.112    0.018  1.51 
    (0.95)   0.016  
FE     -.031  0.200  1.73 
     (1.30)  0.007  
RE     -.042  0.027  1.62 
     (1.97)  0.007  
Numbers inside parentheses are autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity adjusted t-ratios. 
FE refers to the fixed affects model and RE the random effects model. All estimating 
equations also include the AGRI, POP and TRADE variables. 
 
 
Table A4.  Dynamic panel data estimates 
      for the updated panel data 
 
Dependent 
variable  VAR(y)-1 EXP  GGC  TAX  SEE J/NI 
EXP .140  -.037      .0044  78.7 
 (19.44)  (3.40)        77 
GGC .139    -.148    .0043  78.8 
 (18.27)    (4.64)      77 
TAX  .137    -.043  .0043  78.3 
  (18.38)    (4.11)    77 
All estimates are Arellano-Bond GMM estimates were both first differences and lagged 
levels are used as instruments. All estimating equations also include the AGRI, POP and 





Table A5.  Panel data estimation results 





dependent  G R
2/SEE DW 
TAX-EXP .605  .082  0.720  2.30 
 (12.91)  (3.26)  4.89   
TAX .702  -.008  .841  2.45 
 (12.51)  (0.34)  4.78   
EXP .682  -.098  0.778  2.49 
 (9.90)  (2.55)  7.76   
∆GG  -.046 .550  0.109  2.03 
 (1.68)  (8.40)  0.108   
Numbers inside parentheses are autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity adjusted t-ratios. 
All estimates OLS estimates with cross-section fixed effects. All estimating equations 
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